

United States Environmental Protection Agency
Criminal Investigation Division
Investigative Activity Report

Case Number

0600-0539

Case Title:

Team, Inc.

Reporting Office:

Dallas, TX, Area Office

Subject of Report:

[REDACTED] Interview

Activity Date:

July 31, 2010

Reporting Official and Date:

[REDACTED], SA

05-OCT-2010, Signed by [REDACTED], SA

Approving Official and Date:

[REDACTED], SAC

12-OCT-2010, Approved by [REDACTED], SAC

SYNOPSIS

07/31/2010 - [REDACTED] said that everyone, including [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], was aware of using "function 3" to falsify tests and manipulate data. [REDACTED] said that before [REDACTED] became Operations manager, the guys didn't have any set routine or schedule and would sit around in the office punching in numbers.

[REDACTED] warned [REDACTED] against an incentive program to perform more tests; however the program was still instituted at the [REDACTED] under [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] added that TEAM management was unsupportive of [REDACTED] in [REDACTED] effort to fix things.

DETAILS

On July 31, 2010, Special Agent [REDACTED] and Regional Criminal Enforcement Officer (RCEO) [REDACTED] interviewed [REDACTED] at a [REDACTED] located on [REDACTED]. [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] introduced themselves via credentials and informed [REDACTED] of the purposes of the interview. [REDACTED] provided the following information:

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] noted that [REDACTED] actually ran most of the area, while [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] said TEAM was pretty good on safety issues. Regarding monitoring procedures [REDACTED] said

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TEAM always stressed using the proper methods and warned against falsifying anything. [REDACTED] added that TEAM emphasized that if anything was done wrong, EPA could be “knocking on their door.” [REDACTED] said that they (TEAM) had two or three guys that they let go as soon as they could prove tests were falsified.

When asked about equipment failures, [REDACTED] said that they used old TVA 1000's with Leak Trackers or “99 data loggers”. [REDACTED] said TEAM always had equipment breaking down. TEAM would send the broken equipment to Houston to be fixed. [REDACTED] said that the customers, including [REDACTED] wanted them to get new equipment.

[REDACTED] recalled [REDACTED] worked hard trying to convince [REDACTED] [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] told [REDACTED], that corporate would have to send [REDACTED] that slowly but surely, the Borger office got new equipment.

[REDACTED] said that [REDACTED] heard rumors that TEAM employees were not actually doing the quantity of tests being reported. [REDACTED] heard the reason TEAM lost the Chevron contract was because TEAM's gate times at Chevron didn't match up with the hours that TEAM was billing Chevron. [REDACTED] went on to say [REDACTED] understanding was the difference in time billed and gate times was that TEAM included the time necessary to work on their equipment at the TEAM office off site.

[REDACTED] explained that it was TEAM's practice to have a Database Administrator (DBA) do mass edits on monitoring tests before the data was released to the facility. For example, when an employee turned in monitoring test results the numbers may have ranged from 3 – 5; those results would be changed to show a “4.” [REDACTED] said a corporate memo came out sometime in 2006 or 2007 addressing the mass edits. The e-mail, from [REDACTED], advised the offices to stop doing mass edits, and to stop recording data on paper. [REDACTED] opined this e-mail was supposed to stop both of those practices.

[REDACTED] explained it was possible to punch in readings on the monitoring equipment by pushing “function 3” and then entering a number. [REDACTED] noted a lot of TEAM's work was done on paper; [REDACTED] speculated this is what made it possible to successfully falsify monitoring tests. [REDACTED] said that before [REDACTED] took over as [REDACTED] saw some readings that were 3 seconds apart and about the same concentration, and written on paper; which indicated falsified tests.

[REDACTED] said that everyone was aware of using “function 3” to falsify tests. [REDACTED] stated [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] talked about it all the time. [REDACTED] said [REDACTED] was at the office and saw the falsification going on, and [REDACTED] told [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] it was going on but [REDACTED] never did anything about it.

[REDACTED] said that before [REDACTED] became [REDACTED], the guys didn't have any set routine or schedule, the guys would sit around in the office punching in numbers. They would come in around 9:00 or 10:00, work an hour, go to lunch, come back and work about an hour, yet still get 300 – 400 tests completed. [REDACTED] explained that a person working all day could get about 500 tests done. However, if a person was getting more than 600 tests in a day, there was probably something going on. [REDACTED] added that if guys were spending way too much time in the office, but coming in with a lot of numbers, “it's got to raise your eyebrows.”

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Interview ended at 12:49 hours.

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